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ABSTRACT 
DIANA PARTRIDGE: Reforming the Welfare State, the case of part-time work in Sweden and 
France 
(Under the direction of: John D. Stephens and Vivien A. Schmidt) 
 
 
 
Countries have different approaches to part-time work in terms of organization of working hours, 
associated benefits, wages and the status of workers. Over the last few decades, different European 
member states have also had varying degrees of success at passing off part-time work as an 
acceptable form of employment to their citizens. In this paper I compare the reform of part-time work 
and non-standard work arrangements in Sweden and France. I explain that political decision-makers 
success or failure to implement part-time and temporary work reform is due to national differences in 
four areas: welfare state regimes; politics, specifically social partners and political power distribution; 
the organization of the female labor force; and political discourses.   
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Introduction 
Part-time work and temporary work arrangements as a percentage of total employment have 
steadily increased in Europe over the last ten years, giving rise to one of the most important changes 
in national employment structures (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998). Often they serve as tools to promote 
market flexibility, create jobs, reorganize working time, and facilitate women’s entry into the labor 
market. Universal trends in part-time work among European member states are apparent. It is 
performed mostly by women, it is frequently associated with marginal employment, and its increase 
has coincided with industrial restructuring and higher levels of female participation in the labor 
market (O’Reilly and Fagan 1998: 1). In theory, both employers and employees benefit. For 
employers, part-time work may allow greater flexibility in responding to market requirements (i.e. by 
increasing capacity or extending opening hours), while for employees it may allow for a better 
balance between working life and other activities (such as family responsibilities, training, leisure or 
civic activities). Additionally, it may assist marginal members of the work force, such as youths and 
elderly, to transition into or out of full-time employment.  
In spite of many cross-national similarities, countries take different approaches to part-time 
work in matters of organization of working hours, associated benefits, wages and the status of 
workers. Over the last few decades, different member states have also had varying degrees of success 
at passing off part-time work as an acceptable form of employment to their citizens. In the case of 
France, consistently low levels of employment have meant that part-time and temporary work 
arrangements have been used as instruments of job creation. These arrangements, largely affecting 
marginal members of the labor market (youths, elderly, and women), were and continue to be seen as 
an option of last resort in lieu of full-time employment (Carre 2003: 134). By comparison, part-time 
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work in Sweden has been cast in a much more positive light. It is instead seen as a means to facilitate 
and promote women’s entry into the work force, while allowing for more flexible working hours and 
a better balance between working and personal life. 
In this paper, I will consider what factors account for differences in part-time and temporary 
work arrangements in Sweden and France, and specifically, why the reform of part-time work has 
been more effective in Sweden than in France. One might expect that a country with strong ‘state-
enhanced’ capitalism (Schmidt 1996), and weak and fragmented labor unions, such as France, would 
have a much easier time implementing changes to existing legislation, whereas a corporatist country, 
such as Sweden with traditionally powerful and well organized unions, would struggle to pass 
reforms. Yet, the opposite seems to be the case. Moreover, why do workers seem to accept non-
standard working arrangements in Sweden but not in France?  
 I argue that this is due mainly to four factors. First, both countries belong to a different 
welfare regime: Sweden falls into the social democratic welfare regime, which ensures a basic level 
of security, serving as a safety net for all citizens, as well as income security in the form of high 
income replacement rates in the case of temporary or permanent interruption of work (Stephens 1996: 
34). By contrast, in Christian democratic France, while benefits and pensions are also based on 
working contributions accumulated over a lifetime, the same safety net is not present. Citizens can 
only access the majority of benefits through permanent full-time work which creates an insider 
outsider welfare system, providing generous benefits to some and minimal assistance to unemployed, 
temporary and part-time workers. Secondly, societal openness to legislative reform largely depends 
on national state structures. In France, fragmented social partners are overshadowed by a centralized 
government with relatively few veto points, which has passed a large body of legislation on part-time 
work over the years. This legislation has proved cumbersome and difficult to reform because the 
French public responds to the slightest suggestion of cutbacks with protests and strikes. On the other 
hand, in corporatist Sweden the high level of organization of social partners has allowed effective 
part-time agreements to develop while the state has stepped aside. Thirdly, the entry of women into 
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the labor market has occurred in specific historical circumstances and in response to varied labor 
demands, contributing to different availability and organization of part-time work. France has been 
plagued with high structural unemployment since the end of its Golden Age, and has used part-time 
work primarily as a means of work-sharing. By contrast, in Sweden, married women’s entry into the 
work-force was mainly in response to a shortage of manpower and an expanding public sector. 
Fourthly, national discourses surrounding the issue of part-time work have been presented differently. 
In Sweden, part-time work earned public acceptance because it was endorsed as a means for women 
to gain independence and establish their identity outside of the home. In France, public discourse has 
failed to present part-time work in a positive light. Reforms were/are instead perceived as a neoliberal 
attack on the French model of society, strongly rooted in a tradition of solidarity.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First I begin with brief look at the rates of part-time work 
in Europe before turning to examine part-time work in my two cases, Sweden and France. Next, I use 
the four factors mentioned above to explain why the success of part-time work reform has been 
different in both countries. I address these factors in four sections, each beginning with a brief 
theoretical framework and then analyzing the labor market in both Sweden and France.  
 
  
 
 
 
Part-time work 
 The European Union 
Part-time work has increased in all EU member states over the past few decades. In 1992, 14.2% 
of EU workers worked on a part-time basis but by the end of 2006, this figure had risen to 18.8% 
(Romans and Hardarson 2007). However, great diversity in part-time employment rates exists 
between member states, industrial sectors, occupations, age, and gender. In 2006, part-time work 
accounted for 32.7% of total female employment and 7.7% of total male employment. The highest 
presence of part-time workers can be observed in the Netherlands (46.2% of total employment) 
making it an outlier with a 20.5% lead on the second place member state, the United Kingdom (25.7 
%), followed by Germany (25.4%), Sweden (24.6%), Denmark (24.1%), Belgium (21.8%), and 
Austria (21.3%). Middle ranging countries include France (17.4%), Luxembourg (17.1%), and 
Finland (15%). The Southern Mediterranean countries follow with Italy (13.6%), Spain (11.9%), 
Portugal (11.6%), Greece (5.7%). Finally, the lowest presence of part-time employment is found in 
those countries admitted in the 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargements: Romania (9.9%), Lithuania 
(9.4%), Estonia (7.9%), Czech Republic (4.9%), Poland (9.3%), Hungary (3.9), Slovakia (2.7%), and 
Bulgaria (1.7%) (Eurostat Labour Market Latest Trends 4th quarter 2006 data). 
Part-Time Work in France 
Since the 1970’s, the percentage of workers working part-time in France has greatly 
increased, from 6% in 1970 to 17% of the working population in 1999 (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi 1999: 
5). This figure has since stabilized at around 17% (17.4% in 2006), placing the country below the EU 
average. This increase has not been continuous, surging from 1980 to 1986 with the first general 
regulation of part-time work, and after 1992 with the introduction of specific measures encouraging 
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part-time work. In France, most part-time jobs are available in the tertiary sector (health, education, 
social services, personal services, and commerce) and affect mostly low-skill occupations. Finally, 
youths, elderly, and women hold the highest percentage of part-time jobs. Since women have access 
to generous networks of childcare, albeit not as generous as the Scandinavian countries, part-time 
work is seen as an option of last resort for mothers with several children, those recovering from 
illness, or those entering or exiting the labor market (Zeytinoglu and Muteshi 1999: 5). 
The attitude towards part-time work in France is notably different from certain other 
European countries where it is welcomed by employers as a means to meet spikes in the work-load 
associated with fluctuations in customer activity. Instead, French employers rarely perceive part-time 
work as a strategic advantage for their companies and have shown greater reluctance to create part-
time jobs due to a generally more rigid legislative framework surrounding working time. In a case 
study on the use of part-time work in retail banking, “managers in the banking sector tended to be 
much more hostile to the use of part-time work in a society where full-time work was seen as the 
norm” (Crompton 2000: 214). In fact, part-timers were segregated into areas where their absence 
would not be disruptive and company organization focused around full-time workers. Managers and 
supervisors claimed that part-time work mostly benefited employees rather than employers or 
companies because it allowed employees to keep more flexible working hours (Crompton 2000: 214). 
Still today, workers can legally request to work part-time based on provisions spelled out in the ‘Code 
du Travail.’ A possible explanation can be found in the history of French labor market legislation.  
Part-time work in France originally developed outside of a regulatory framework and was 
managed through individual contracts or specific collective agreements (Laulom 2004: 87). After 
1936, strict regulation on working time, such as the 40 hour working week, was introduced which 
essentially prohibited the use of part time work. Furthermore, national insurance contributions of 
employers were based on the size of their working force instead of proportional to pay (Crompton 
2000: 216; Droulers 1972). Specific aspects of part-time work were only touched upon by certain 
legislation, such as the Law of 1970, which authorized the occasional use of part-time work in the 
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public sector (Laulom 2004: 87).  Only in 1973 did a strained labor market and employer demands 
lead to a reform of the legal framework to facilitate the use of part-time workers. “The Law of 27 
December 1973 gave part-time employees equal footing compared to full-time workers concerning 
rights based on the length of service and therefore constituted the first example of applying the 
principle of equality between the two categories” (Laulom 2004: 87). In the 1980’s more 
comprehensive legislation was created due to the dual pressures of rising unemployment and demands 
for greater flexibility from employers who faced greater international competition (Crompton 2000: 
217). The Law of 28 January 1981 tried to promote the use of part-time work by abolishing certain 
regulations making it unattractive to employers. However, criticisms against it led to the Government 
Order of 26 March 1982, which legally established equality, of wages and social security benefits, 
between part-time and full-time employees, (Crompton 2000: 217) In the following years, part-time 
work underwent a series of reforms focusing on three main ideas. First, part-time work could be used 
to share out employment and reduce unemployment because more part-time work would allow for 
greater job creation. Second, part-time work could increase labor market flexibility. Third, it could 
allow employees greater flexibility between their working and personal life. 
 Starting in 1992 and for the following 6 years, the French government focused heavily on 
work sharing via the promotion of part-time work, even offering financial aid to companies hiring 
part-time workers. The lois Aubry I (1998) and Aubry II (2000) imposed a reduction of working time, 
signaling a shift in the approach to part-time work and the regulation of working hours. Originally, 
the regulation of working hours was achieved through collective bargaining. In 1997, a tripartite 
conference on pay and working time, involving employers’ associations, trade unions and the French 
state, was supposed to negotiate a 35 hour work week; however, the negotiation process broke down 
and ended with legislative intervention. Aubry passed through Parliament in May 1998, and was 
validated by the Constitutional Council in June, setting the length of the statutory working week at 35 
hours as of 1 January 2000 in companies employing more than 20 people, and in small firms from 1 
January 2002. It is important to note that this shortening of the statutory work week does not 
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necessarily imply a shortening of working time, but only a threshold above which hourly pay must be 
increased. Thus other incentives for reducing working time were also needed such as exemptions 
from social security contributions for complying companies (Laulom 2004: 88). 
  The two lois Aubry legislations were a source of major change in the French labor market 
including the alteration of part-time work regulation. Financial subsidies previously awarded for part-
time work were abolished as part-time work was pushed to the back burner of the national agenda, as 
it was no longer the priority in employment policy. Therefore the previous balance between flexibility 
and security in part-time work shifted towards a greater focus on flexibility. According to the 
government in the Preamble to the Law of 19 January 2000, part-time work would now make it 
“easier to reconcile professional life and private life” (Laulom 2004: 88).  The French government’s 
attitude towards part-time work was greatly shaped by the limits of the 35 hour statutory work week 
and thus is not an attitude largely shared at a European level, raising the question of whether French 
labor law is compatible with the EES Guidelines (Laulom 2004: 89).  
Part-time work in Sweden 
Part-time work in Sweden plays a different role than in France and most European countries. 
Sweden has one of the highest rates of part-time employment in Europe, almost 90% of which is 
women (Eurostat 2006). While a high rate of female participation characterizes a number of other 
industrial countries, it occurs for seemingly different reasons in Sweden which will be addressed later 
in this paper (Anxo and Storrie 2003: 60). This tendency was first recorded in the employment 
statistics in 1963 which figured that 456,000 women worked part-time. However, just a few years 
later in 1970 the rate rose to 594,000, a significant increase of about 30% in a short period of time. At 
the same time, the increase in women’s full-time participation was minimal, only 3% or 898,000 to 
925,000 (Eklund 2004).  
In France and Europe as a whole, the growth of part-time work tended to be associated with 
job insecurity. Its increase was a response to high unemployment rates where women were typically 
subject to employers ‘short-run employment adjustment’ (Anxo and Storrie 2003: 60). Thus part-time 
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work was normally concentrated in sectors with significant employee turn-over and short-term 
contracts. In Sweden, however, the surge in part-time work in the 1970’s was not connected with job 
insecurity or used as an alternative to unemployment; it was instead used to promote the employment 
of married women. Involuntary part-time work was relatively low and the opportunity to increase 
working hours to full-time if desired was usually attainable (Anxo and Storrie 2003: 60). 
As mentioned previously, Swedish law provides virtually no regulation of part-time work, 
other than that all citizens have the right to it. Working contracts specifying the number of hours 
worked must be agreed upon by the social partners and require mutual consent for all modifications. 
The State plays little role and is absent from wage rate negotiations. In contrast to their French 
counterparts, most economists, trade unions, employers and political parties in Sweden are strongly 
opposed to the practice of job-sharing. “Job-sharing is a non-issue in Sweden,” (Bjorklund 2000: 154) 
and the Government has never seriously considered adopting policies to encourage the entry of 
workers into part-time employment.  
One of the reasons part-time work is an accepted alternative to full-time work is that Swedes 
in part-time employment tend to work more hours than their French counterparts. While a part-time 
worker in France averages around 15 to 20 hours a week, a part-time worker in Sweden works closer 
to 30 hours per week. Another important aspect of part-time work is the extensive number of options 
for full-time employees to take leaves of absence. On a leave of parental absence or study leave, an 
employee is legally entitled to significant reductions in his or her working time beyond what was 
contractually agreed. A parent, for instance, can reduce his or her previous hours worked by 75% 
until the youngest child is eight years old (Eklund 2004: 271). This is not officially part-time 
employment as the employee is still technically employed full-time and can legally return to regular 
hours at anytime. However, the distinction between part-time work and leave of absence is often 
blurred (Eklund: 271).  
 Two main pieces of legislation exist concerning part-time work in Swedish labor law. The 
first, the Employment Protection Act of 1974 concerns employees’ right to access a greater number of 
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working hours. The second piece of legislation, the Work Hours Act of 1982, deals with hours 
surpassing the contractually agreed working time. Both laws have been subject to reform since their 
original implementation. The Employment Protection Act was brought back under scrutiny when the 
Government Commission of 1993 addressed the issue of whether an employer needing more 
manpower should be required to offer part-time workers the option of increasing working time before 
extending the offer to the general public. The report concluded that this was not necessary because 
national collective agreements in theory already reached a negotiation suitable to both parties and in 
practice employers already gave priority to part-time employees through internal networks, job 
postings and the like. However, when issue surfaced again in 1996, this time under a Socialist 
government, the legislation was finally reformed, in effect as of January 1st, 1997, requiring 
employers to give priority to part-time workers wishing to increase individual working time before 
extending the offer to the general public (Eklund 2004: 273). The second piece of legislation, 
established under the Working Hours Act of 1982, deals with hours worked beyond individual 
contractual agreements. The Act sets maximum overtime at 200 hours per year and prohibits most 
instances of night work unless there is a ‘special need’ for the work. However, a large number of 
exceptions are available still allow for flexibility and diversity of working hours (Anxo and Storrie 
2003: 50). Moreover, no maximum daily working time is defined. Working time legislation is 
extremely flexible and permits social partners to negotiate and fix industry wide agreements on 
working hours. Therefore, in practice this act is not binding and can be replaced with collective 
agreements at the industry or plant level (Anxo and Storrie 2003: 50). 
Sweden and France clearly have diverse approaches to part-time work. How can these 
differences be explained? As addressed in the introduction, I attribute national differences in part-
time work to four main factors. The ability to successfully implement reform in the labor market 
(including part-time and temporary work) are due to differences in: (1) welfare regimes, (2) politics, 
including state structure and political power distribution, (3) the organization of the female labor 
force, and finally (4) political discourses.   
  
 
 
 
Welfare Institutions: Different approaches to ‘work and welfare’ 
To understand why part-time work reform has been more successful in Sweden than in 
France we must first take a closer look at welfare state regimes. Different societal concepts of welfare 
states make part-time work easier or harder to reform because they differ in how they link welfare to 
work (Fagan and O’Reilly 1998: 6). The Christian democratic and social democratic welfare regimes 
strive to achieve very different objectives in labor market policy and the distribution of welfare 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). 
The Christian democratic regime takes a 'Welfare through work' approach wherein welfare 
entitlements are based on workplace contributions that a male breadwinner and his employer have 
made to the social insurance scheme throughout his working life (Goodin 2001). The social 
democratic regime strives for 'Welfare and work' by providing a basic level of universal welfare 
benefits linked to citizenship. In return, citizens must make productive contributions whenever they 
can through government-adopted active labor market policies (Goodin 2001). These welfare regimes 
warrant greater analysis as they are the two regimes relevant to this paper.  
Social democratic welfare states are the most egalitarian welfare states in which the idea of 
solidarity is the strongest (Smith 2004: 20). Countries from this welfare typology are characterized by 
high income taxes, generous universally provided welfare state entitlements, low unemployment, and 
high levels of labor force participation, especially for women (Stephens 1996: 32). Huber and 
Stephens (2001: 87) argue that these regimes make for “universalistic, comprehensive, citizenship-
based, income security, gender equality, labor mobility welfare states.” Social democratic parties 
were often the dominant force behind social reform, shaping welfare states that promote high levels 
of equality, rather than dualism between the state and the market and dualism between work and the 
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middle class (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). In work, the principle of equality is also central, 
concerning both wages and gender. Solidaristic wage policy means equal pay for equal work as well 
as a compression of wage scales (Schmidt 2000: 256). Therefore, the rights of manual workers equal 
the rights of civil servants and white collar workers (Esping-Andersen 1990: 27). Social democratic 
states rely less on the family’s capacity to aid. Instead they promote the individual independence from 
the market and ‘preemptively socialize the cost of familyhood’ (Esping-Andersen 1990: 28).  
By contrast, the Christian democratic regime makes for a “fragmented, employment-based, 
comprehensive, transfer-heavy, male-breadwinner, passive welfare state” (Huber and Stephens 2001: 
87), which organizes itself around occupational categories, providing benefits based on working 
contributions. The success of this model at universally covering its citizens is therefore heavily reliant 
on its ability to provide full employment (Palier 2006a: 4). These welfare states are designed to 
provide workers with security as well as preserve community, hierarchy and status differentials 
(Esping-Anderson 1990). Social services are usually provided by intermediary or ‘third sector’ bodies 
and are determined by market performance and, again, occupational status. They place a heavy 
emphasis on transfers with substantial income replacement rates in transfer programs (Huber and 
Stephens 2001: 111).  
The Christian democratic model originated in continental Europe under the influence of the 
Catholic Church and dynastic elites (Myles 2002). Catholic doctrine denies the primacy of the market 
and reinforces the dominance of the male breadwinner and the family unit as the main supplier of 
social welfare. Traditionally, these influences are reflected in social spending income transfers that 
assist the male breadwinner (Myles 2002). Under this model, women’s participation in the labor 
market is usually relatively low (France and Belgium being an exception) and women typically gain 
access to social benefits through their husbands. Today social services aimed at facilitating women’s 
employment, such as childcare, remain limited (France and Belgium again being exceptions) (OECD 
2005 data).  
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 These two genres of welfare state also deal with retrenchment or the cutting of benefits 
differently. Esping-Andersen (1996) describes the rigidity of Christian democratic regimes which he 
calls ‘frozen continental landscapes.’ Christian democratic states are locked into their own problems 
by their inability to implement successful reforms. Palier argues that the majority of these systems 
have remained essentially the same because the reforms implemented have only reinforced their 
existing traits (Palier 2006a: 2). Certain institutional traits of the Christian democratic welfare states 
make them particularly resistant to retrenchment. For example, differences in benefit type and the 
way they are financed can have a major impact on the legitimacy of reform. In Christian democratic 
welfare states, most of the cash benefits are contributory, earnings-related benefits, while the majority 
of social expenditure is financed through employment related contributions. Tax- and contribution 
financed schemes have different abilities to attract public support (Palier 2006a; 7-8).  Whereas 
taxation goes to the state, social contributions are perceived as a ‘deferred wage’ which will later be 
returned to the citizen in times of need. Therefore, citizens are less willing to accept reductions in the 
benefits they believe they have earned. On the other hand, citizens frequently prefer to pay more in 
contributions than have their benefits cut. Palier argues that “in Continental Europe, governments 
have long preferred to increase social contributions than to cut social benefits. This is counter-
intuitive from an Anglo-Saxon (and even a Scandinavian) point of view, where the most politically 
risky thing to do is to raise taxes, and where the population prefers some cuts in social programs to 
any tax increases” (Palier 2006a; 7-8). In Sweden some benefits are tied to contributions but most are 
tax financed, while the French welfare state is mostly financed by payroll taxes. This at least partially 
explains the reason cutbacks are easier in Social democratic Sweden than in Christian democratic 
France. Let us now consider how Sweden and France fit into this framework. 
Sweden, the Social democratic example 
The cornerstone of Swedish labor market policy has been egalitarian wage-formation and 
active labor market policies (Benner and Vad 2000: 403). Although Sweden has traditionally 
benefited from low levels of unemployment, crisis in the early 1990’s induced record levels of 
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unemployment which, to an extent, still afflict the country today. Other distinctive features include 
extensive government funded social programs and leave schemes, which provide generous social 
protection and childcare services, as well as universal benefits ensuring income and pension security. 
By means of such securities “the Scandinavian people have accepted the need for the regular 
reconfiguration of their social and economic policies, whether this has taken the form of more part-
time work, government spending cuts, wage restraint, partial privatization of the health-care system, 
or the introduction of supplementary private pensions” (Smith, 2004: 20). 
In industrial relations, social democratic countries typically operate around the principle of 
collective agreement, “granting extensive rights to organize and negotiate on a wide range of issues” 
(Lindquist 2003: 52). The nature of industrial relation in Sweden makes for a high-level of flexibility 
in the arrangement and length of working hours (Anxo and Storrie, 2003: 50) because of its high rate 
of unionization and powerful labor organization with relative autonomy from national authorities. In 
the December Compromise of 1906, workers were granted the right of association and basic rights 
against dismissal for trade union activity. The landmark Saltsjobaden Agreement of 1938 established 
the basis of the Swedish labor by setting patterns in industrial relations, reducing the state’s role in 
employment negotiations to an indirect and facilitating one (Benner and Vad, 2000: 416). 
Furthermore, the Agreement extended union rights for workers and gave trade unions a degree of 
influence over lay-offs and dismissals (Lindquist 2003: 52). Still in force today, it represents a 
“willingness to co-operate, mutual respect, the endeavor to arrive at peaceful solutions based on 
compromise and a sense of responsibility for developments in the labor market” (European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 5 October 2007). Jumping ahead 
to the 1980’s, collective bargaining became much more decentralized, which allowed negotiations 
and decision-making to occur at the firm and plant level (Anxo and Storrie 2003, 50), thus further 
increasing flexibility in working hours.   
 
 
14 
 
France, a Christian democratic exception 
France falls into the Christian democratic regime, though a bit awkwardly. Barbier and Theret 
(2003:155) describe France as a “Bismarckian system with Beveridgean objectives.” France exhibits 
several major identifying Bismarckian features. First, it is founded on social insurance principles and 
funded through social contributions supplied by employers and employees. Benefits do not aim to 
reduce class inequality among workers or to protect non-workers excluded from the market (Barbier 
and Theret 2003). Secondly, France has traditionally followed the male-bread winner model in which 
a worker’s coverage is extended to his wife and children, however today these policies have relatively 
low impact on women’s labor force participation. Thirdly, French unions are highly fragmented, an 
unusual condition for a Christian democratic regime (Barbier and Theret 2003). 
 Since the end of its golden age around 1975, the French labor market has suffered from high 
levels of unemployment, low participation of unskilled and elderly workers, and a relatively low 
average of hours worked (OECD 2006). Despite some improvements during the 1990’s, with 
unemployment declining from 12% in 1997 to 8.5% in 2005 and employment increasing by 11% 
between 1995 and 2005, today unemployment remains a major source of political, social, and 
economic concern (OECD 2006). A major source of unemployment is agreed to be a result of 
France’s over-protected job market. The shift from a 39 to 35-hour workweek by the lois Aubry 2000 
and 2001 was a means of spreading out working hours to create more jobs. Elaborate rules and 
regulations, such as a 2,735-page labor code for the 2006 working year, detail protections on health 
and safety (The Economist, 28 October 2006). Extensive protections for hiring and firing have 
entrenched a two-tier labor market, which provides stable, comfortable jobs for some, and insecure, 
temporary jobs or unemployment for the rest (The Economist, 28 October 2006). 
France’s protest-oriented society, which will be discussed later in more detail, has made even 
minor welfare retrenchment difficult, thus reinforcing Esping-Andersen’s argument that Christian 
democratic welfare regimes are frozen landscapes. “Labor market deregulation is arguably the most 
sensitive issue in the French political economy, as the massive protests that greeted governmental 
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efforts to introduce derogatory youth employment contracts in 1994 (the contrat d’insertion 
professionnelle, CIP) and then again in 2005 (the contrat première embauche, CPE) showed” (Clegg 
and Palier 2007: 18). This is not to say the French labor market has gone unchanged, in fact Palier 
argues in recent years it has undergone fundamental transformation. Between the mid-1980’s and the 
mid-1990’s the use of fixed-term contracts has more than tripled while part-time work has increased 
by almost 50% This can be largely explained by a realignment of French labor market policy, 
justified by social instead of economic objectives (Clegg and Palier 2007: 18). 
  
 
 
 
Politics 
Yet, welfare state regimes alone do not explain why part-time work reform has been met with 
resistance in France and been more or less accepted in Sweden. The strength of social partners and 
political power distribution also play an important role in the ability to successfully implement 
reforms.  
Social Partners 
The organizational power of labor has been a major force in the development of social 
democratic welfare states (Korpi 1983). Cameron (1984) argues that labor's power is an essential 
element of corporatism, a term referring to centralized bargaining conducted by labor, business, and 
the state (Rosenfeld and Kalleberg 1990; Rosenfeld and Birkelund 1995). This might involve 
adjusting the costs and benefits of part-time work (Gornick and Jacobs, 1994). “We would expect 
corporatism and leftist governments to provide the political-institutional frameworks that encourage 
part-time” (Rosenfeld and Birkelund 1995: 11).  
Welfare and country specific traditions concerning the sharing of public space partially 
dictate the degree of influence social partners have on policy outcomes (Ebbinghaus 2006: 7). 
Depending on the mode of social governance available in case of disagreements, social partners veto 
powers can vary. They can either voice their dissent or exit the negotiations (Hirschman 1970). Social 
partners also play an important role in the legitimization of reform. “Unilateral action by the state 
without the social partners consent often meets resistance” (Ebbinghaus 2006: 2).  
In Sweden, strong corporatism and well organized unions have advocated solidarity and 
equality. Early on, social partners were key players in policy formation, particularly in economic and 
labor market policy alongside the state. Strong administrative bodies, unions and employers 
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negotiated and set priorities for labor market policy (Rothstein 1996). “What emerged was a 
consensual and hierarchical system, with close links integrating policy fields and many forums for 
establishing consensus among the important actors” (Benner and Vad 2000: 407). Today, part-time 
work is almost exclusively controlled by social partners as Swedish law provides virtually no 
regulation of part-time work. Working contracts specifying the number of hours to be worked must be 
agreed upon by both parties and require mutual consent for all modifications.  
In comparison, France’s labor movement is fragmented, historically one of the weakest and 
most divided in the advanced industrial world. Union participation peaked around 22% in the 1970s 
with the five principal trade unions exercising only minimal influence over company decisions. 
Instead of participating in formal negotiations, a key tactic of French unions has been to threaten a 
repeat of the December 1995 strikes that the nation was brought to a standstill (Smith 2004: 63).  
French employment policy is also highly fragmented, even compared to other Christian 
democratic welfare states. Social partners manage unemployment insurance through collective 
agreement, employment service is managed by an independent public agency, a national public fund 
controls labor market policy, and there is bipartite vocational training center (Ebbinghaus 2006: 11). 
Working time issue arrangements are regulated mainly through legislation initiated and directed by 
the state. During the 1980’s, seven laws on the issue passed through Parliament (Boulin, Lallement, 
Silvera 2003: 170). “Most measures of active policy are decided by the French state without 
consultation with the social partners” (Mosley, Keller, and Speckesser 1998: 12) while, social 
partners exercise considerable autonomy in the domain of unemployment insurance funds and 
negotiating with the state over financial issues. “French employment policy thus oscillates between 
state imposed solutions and negotiated deals” (Palier 2002: 381). This sheds light on why social 
reforms, specifically those on working time arrangements have been a challenge for France.  
Political Power Distribution 
 The role of political parties, particularly left parties, also indirectly effects welfare state 
patterns. The distribution of political power partially dictates why welfare states treat working time 
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arrangements, specifically part-time and temporary work, differently and explains why part-time 
work reform has been more easily accepted in social democratic welfare states than Christian 
democratic ones. “Fragmented oppositions leave more room for welfare state expansion but are less 
effective advocates of retrenchment” (Castle 1978; Huber and Stephens 2001: 20). Strong leftist 
parties push competing centrist parties to adopt more generous welfare programs, especially when 
they are competing for working class support (Huber and Stephens 2001: 20). Leftist parties are more 
likely than conservative ones to promote state expenditure, expanding the public-sector and as such 
creating policies aimed at reducing inequalities between individuals (Cameron 1984). Huber and 
Stephens argue that the differences among welfare states are best predicted by the political party in 
power ‘over the long run’ (Huber, Ragin, Stephens 1993; Huber and Stephens 2000; Huber Stephens 
2001: 20). Strong unions combined with a social democratic party will likely promote a “generous 
welfare state with universalistic, citizenship-based, solidaristic, redistributive, and service-oriented 
character” (Castles 1982; Myles 1984; Korpi 1989; Palme 1990; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; 
Korpi and Palme 1998; Huber and Stephens 2000a; Huber and Stephens 2001: 41). Where Christian 
democratic parties have a strong influence with a major lower and middle class backing, a welfare 
state with insurance based entitlements develops (Huber and Stephens 2001: 41). Thus, benefits are 
transferred based on employment contributions instead of distributed based on citizenship. 
In France, political control was not dominated by the Christian Democrats or by the Social 
Democrats. The expulsion of the Communist Party from 1947 until 1981 severely limited the leverage 
of Socialist and leftist influence on government policy during the remainder of the Fourth Republic 
and during the first twenty-three years of the Fifth Republic. The Christian Democrats influence was 
also limited with the emergence of the Gaullist movement, and was virtually non-existent by the 
beginning of the Fifth Republic (Levy 2000). Despite right party control, French social spending grew 
rapidly under Gaullist rule.  
In Sweden, the strength of the Social Democratic Party and the dominance of labor 
movement greatly shaped the institutional capacity of the welfare state. Sweden’s multi-party system 
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has been dominated by the Social Democratic Party for 65 out of the last 75 years (Benner and Vad 
2000: 407). The strength of farming interests led political representatives to vie for reforms that 
benefited everyone in the constituency and not only wage earners, eventually leading to universal 
coverage (Huber and Stephens 2001: 117). Ideas of universal coverage entered political debate at 
least as early as 1928 when Gustav Moller, the Social Democratic social minister at the time, 
promoted the idea that social policy should provide financial support to all as a basic right of 
citizenship (Huber and Stephens 2001: 119).   
  
 
 
 
Women’s Labor Force Participation 
Up until now, I have addressed how welfare institutions and political contexts have affected 
the capacity of part-time work reform in Sweden and France, however, women’s labor force 
participation also strongly affects part-time work. Part-time work is mainly women’s work, a logical 
phenomenon since many women have unpaid family responsibilities that extend beyond their paid 
work. Particularly when other sources of income are available through spouse and the welfare state, 
women may use part-time work as a way to balance family responsibilities with working life. 
“Women’s part-time work relates to the interconnection among the family, the state, and the market, 
which vary across societies depending upon their historical, cultural, and political traditions” (Orloff 
1993; Rosenfeld and Birkelund 1995: 3). Where social democratic welfare states, extensive leftist 
party control, and well organized female labor exist, there tends to be high legitimacy of part-time 
work.  
Part-time work is more prevalent in countries with large service sectors. Social democratic 
welfare-state regimes, compared with Christian democratic welfare states, might enact more policies 
to accommodate women's participation in the labor force and have a higher level of 
‘decommodification’, as well as require and encourage a larger public sector (Esping-Andersen 
1990). The growth of the welfare state, especially in the Nordic countries, has corresponded to growth 
of public-sector employment, where there are more part-time jobs (Rein 1985). Huber and Stephens 
(2001) argue that an increase in female participation often leads to a higher demand for public care 
giving as women have more responsibilities outside the home and less time to dedicate to their own 
families. When an expanding welfare state is combined with support from political actors, the result is 
more generous family policies such as parental leave and public day care. In turn more women enter 
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the market to fill the demand for labor in these services. Women fill jobs in the public sector, since 
services are provided by the state, allowing them a higher level of organization in unions and a 
greater ability to politically mobilize  (Huber and Stephens 2001: 47). 
Different countries provide different costs, advantages, and accommodations of women’s 
work, such as social welfare benefits, vacations, leaves, health insurance, pensions, and 
unemployment insurance, which affect the degree of 'decommodification,' making it more or less 
beneficial to work part-time (Rosenfeld and Birkelund 1995). Joint or individual tax systems 
influence women’s incentive to take a part-time job. The switch from full-time to part-time work also 
affects women differently in different genres of welfare state. In Christian democratic welfare states, 
switching to a part-time job often entails an occupational down-grading, affecting earnings far beyond 
the intensive child-rearing years. This affects not only salary but also pensions. If a woman 
temporarily leaves her job for child-bearing she may lose accumulated occupational pension rights 
(Glover and Arber 1995; Ginn and Arber 1998: 157). In social democratic countries the impact of 
switching to part-time work is less negative because women are allowed much greater flexibility in 
returning to work with reduced hours allowing them to maintain continuous employment (Ginn and 
Arber 1998: 157).  
Many of the institutional, political and ideological differences affecting female labor force 
participation are the result of specific historical contexts. Barbara Hobson and Marika Lindholm 
argue (1997) that the process of identity formation is essential to understanding the ‘ability of 
collectives to articulate claims and exercise power in welfare states.’ Using Sweden as a case study, 
she demonstrates that women’s rights movements in the 1930’s transformed social norms surrounding 
the relationship between women, citizenship and employment. She asserts that looking at the Swedish 
welfare state through this lens provides insight into the development of women friendly policies that 
have emerged in later decades, making it easier for women to opt for part-time work. And in fact, 
even in Sweden with its paradigm power resources and left party strength, the unique historical 
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influence of the Swedish feminist movement lends to a deeper understanding of welfare state 
formation (Hobson 1997). 
In Sweden, part-time work was used to encourage married women’s participation in the labor 
market. Unlike many other European countries, such as France, it was not used as means of work 
sharing but as a transition between non-participation and full-time work for women with children. 
This use of part-time work was strongly backed by political institutions starting in the 1930’s. Wage 
work for women developed in the 1930’s after a period of economic crisis and high unemployment 
from the late nineteenth century until the end of the 1920’s. In the late 1960’s, a dramatic increase in 
public employment, primarily in public services such as health care, childcare, care for the elderly, 
and education prompted a rapid increase of female labor force participation, with about 500,000 
housewives entering the labor market during this period (Axelson 1992; Benner and Vad 2000: 406). 
Benner and Vad explain that this was largely due to the ‘radicalization’ of the Social Democratic 
Party in the late 1960’s who promised to promote gender equality by improving conditions for 
women in the labor market. Economic prosperity during in the 1970’s and 1980’s reinforced a 
generous welfare state based on the principles of solidarity, employment for all, and flexible working 
hours. 
Family-friendly provisions such as parental leave have reduced inequalities between Swedish 
men and women (Daune-Richard 1998: 224). The Swedish tax system which changed from a joint to 
individual system in 1970 in the ‘greatest equality reform ever’ intended to promote equality between 
men and women as well as increase the supply of female labor (Benner and Vad 2000: 402). 
Meanwhile, France still has a joint taxation system (Daune-Richard 1998: 216). Policies introduced to 
promote flexibility of working hours in Sweden have led to dramatic increases in the amount of paid 
leave and permitted absences. Maternity and parental leave grant couples an allocation of up to 65 
weeks of shared leave. For the first 52 weeks, wage replacement is high, at 80 to 100 percent, and for 
the remaining 13 weeks it drops to approximately SEK 1,800 ($187) per month. Benefits can also be 
paid while the parent works part-time and are adjusted accordingly (Gornick and Meyers 2003: 122). 
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Historically, France was slower to industrialize than other European countries. Family forms 
of production, served as the main source of women’s work for a long time (Daune-Richard 1998: 
222). When women finally entered the work force in the 1970’s, they followed the traditional male 
pattern of working full-time, made easier by the relatively generous state-provided child care and 
family allowances. Part-time work was rare and unattractive to employers because they had to pay 
contributions based on the number of workers and not the number of hours worked. Additionally, 
part-time work was opposed by the trade unions because it was perceived as a threat to traditional 
working arrangements. However, the economic crisis in the late 1970’s created a shortage of full-time 
jobs, forcing more and more women to take up part-time work. Moreover, new legislation introduced 
in the 1980’s made part-time work financially more attractive to employers as a means of increasing 
labor market flexibility both ‘functionally and numerically’ (Daune-Richard 1998: 222).  
 With regards to women friendly policies, France is also an outlier from the traditional 
Christian democratic model. Universal family allocations and policies, such as childcare benefits and 
services permit mother’s to take up full-time employment more easily. Public leave benefits grant 
employed mothers up to 16 weeks at full pay for the first two children, and 26 weeks of leave for the 
third and subsequent children at 100 percent of wages, up to a certain cap (Gornick and Meyers 2003: 
125). With such policies, France is the closest of the Christian democratic welfare regimes to 
establishing a ‘dual-earner’ system for couples. Regarding family policies, France has had a wide-
ranging system, “including tax credits, quasi-universal provision of early education, the vast array of 
benefits managed by the Family funds (CAF, Caisses d’allocations familiales), the departments’ 
general social assistance and families assistance, and the municipalities’ childcare services and 
crèches” (Barbier 1990; Barbeir and Theret 2003: 136). France has traditionally promoted natalist 
policies by providing incentives for women with multiple children (normally benefits can be accessed 
with the third and subsequent children). In 1985 for example, Allocation parentale d’éducation (APE) 
gave a replacement income to parents who temporarily left work to care for a third child. This was 
only awarded on the condition that the parent had worked two years in employment during the 30 
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months before the birth of the third child (Barbeir and Theret 2003: 136). In 1994 this benefit was 
extended to parents with two children, as well as women working part-time. However, its’ policies, 
especially concerning parental leave, are still not as generous as in Sweden and working time 
organizational measures tend to be gender discriminatory, giving men wage compensation while 
putting women in jobs with lower pay and reduced working hours.  
  
 
 
 
Political discourse 
Finally, differences in political discourse help explain why part-time work has developed 
dissimilarly in France and Sweden. Politicians have used discourse, meaning what policy actors say 
to each other, in attempt to present and gain support for their political programs. They appeal to 
national values and identities, collective memories, and social norms to influence public opinion in 
favor of or against a certain policy, sometimes overcoming institutional, political, or cultural 
obstacles. Countries with power concentrated in the executive tend to engage in ‘communicative 
discourses’, wherein the government proposes legislation with little negotiation with social partners 
and then justifies it to the public and other political actors. By contrast, countries with dispersed 
power, be it institutionally or by way of strong social partners and/or organization of labor, tend to 
use ‘coordinated discourse’, in which a large number of policy actors negotiate and agree upon 
policies before the government proposes them (Schmidt 2002: 211-2). Since these governments 
consult major policy actors in a more open process of deliberation in which objections are heard and 
have the chance to be incorporated before announcing a decision, new legislation frequently enjoys a 
greater level of legitimacy and discursive authority (Mayntz, Streeck, Scharpf 2003: 335). 
“In France, temporary work is still scorned as precarious work "(New York times 11 may 
2006). Reform of working time arrangements is made difficult because part-time and temporary work 
have been tainted by association with job insecurity. Politicians and social partners have used 
discourse as a powerful ideological and political tool, although not always one that they can control in 
the long term, to direct protests and influence public opinion (Smith 2004: 63). France does not have 
a strong coordinated discourse and politicians instead attempt to legitimize reforms through 
communicative discourse, but frequently only after they have already been passed into law and often 
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with little to no prior consultation of trade unions or social partners. Schmidt (2000: 293) asserts that 
France’s communicative nature originated from the single-actor system set in motion by de Gaulle, 
“where power was concentrated in an executive which formulated ‘heroic’ policies largely without 
interest group or societal input.” If the government is successful at convincing the public reform is 
necessary, the law remains intact but, and more often than not, if they are unsuccessful the country 
erupts in protests and the law is usually revoked. The French public is renowned for its opposition to 
the introduction of any element of individual risk into its social model. Even more, there exists a 
perpetuated mistrust of open markets reinforcing the French reflex to regard change as an attack on 
social ‘acquis,’ or non-negotiables. “The problem is that France lacks politicians talking directly 
about real and ultimate solutions, and explaining how to get them through honestly and accepting the 
associated risks” (Vinocur 21 March, 2006).  
 The government’s habit of minimal to non-existent consultation with social partners, has 
made reform nearly impossible for most of the recent prime ministers. Edouard Balladur (1993-95), 
was renowned for his ‘Balladur method’, which involved a direct negotiation between the state and 
the citizens (Levy 2000).  He would put forth an initiative without any warning and await public 
reaction. If citizens objected he would withdraw it immediately. In the beginning of 1994 he 
attempted to create a sub-minimum wage for youths known as the SMIC to encourage greater hiring 
flexibility for employers. However, after mass protests, he withdrew his proposal. As soon as French 
voters got wind of political weakness, they began protesting at his every reform. His successor, Alain 
Juppé (1995-1997), forced his ‘secretly conceived’ Juppé Plan through Parliament in 1995, also after 
little consultation with social partners. Three-week transport strikes ensued, paralyzing the country 
and forcing President Chirac to revoke the reform on public sector pensions (Levy 2000). In 2003, 
Raffarin reformed civil servant retirement benefits prompting two weeks of protests (Smith 2004). 
Although his proposals eventually passed, his public approval ratings plummeted so abysmally that in 
2005 he was dismissed (The Economist, 2 June 2005).  
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In 2006, after hardly any consultations with social partners, former Prime Minister 
Dominique de Villepin cut short parliamentary debate and forced the CPE into law by means of 
Article 49.3 of the Constitution, which allows the Prime Minister to force a bill into law without a 
parliamentary vote. In numerous interviews he attempted to justify his decision as a necessary 
response to France’s unemployment crisis and as a means of encouraging employers to hire youths. 
“Youth unemployment is approaching 23% and remains one of the highest in Europe. We conceived 
the CPE for young people in difficulty, those who fill CDD (contrats a durées determinés), 
internships, and periods of interim….” (LCI/TF1, 9 February 2006). From a business perspective, 
Henri Lachmann, the chairman of Schneider electrical goods claimed, "It's [The CPE is] a way for 
French business to counterbalance the rigidity of the French labor market” (Tagliabue 11 May 2006). 
Despite the government’s efforts, the public was not convinced and retaliated in immense nation-wide 
protests. Finally in April 2006 the government caved into the pressure and revoked the reform. 
The situation appeared to be improving with the election of Sarkozy in May 2007, as he 
attempted to consult social partners and take a coordinative approach to reform. Before even 
assuming his functions he requested a meeting with five of France’s major unions to discuss 
upcoming reforms. The secretary general of FO, Jean-Claude Mailly responded, “It’s a first. We will 
not reproach him and listen to what he has to say to us” (Libération 14 May 2007).  However, 
successful negotiations seems to have been short lived as five of the eight French unions called a 
strike October 18 and again on November 14 to defend, this time, pension benefits (Le Monde 21 
September 2007). 
By contrast, an idea of consensus renders Swedes much less resistant to reform. "‘I think the 
fundamental aspect of the Scandinavian model is trust’ among the unions, the government and the 
people,” said Joakim Palme, an ‘expert’ on Nordic welfare systems and the son of the murdered 
prime minister, Olof Palme. “While many in France fear globalization, the Scandinavian experience 
has been to be positive to this change” (New York Times 10 May 2006). Why might this be the case? 
One important difference is that Sweden uses both coordinative and communicative discourse. Well 
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organized social partners and public sector workers, and powerful trade unions have allowed non-
state actors to contribute their input and lobby government officials before legislation is passed, in 
turn giving approved laws a greater legitimacy. Sweden’s discourse is not fully coordinated though; 
the state has had increasingly greater control over the welfare state, ever since the breakdown of 
centralized bargaining in the early 1980’s. Since that time, the legitimizing discourse has been more 
and more communicative (Schmidt 2000: 260-2).  
Equality with regards to wages and gender has been the leitmotif of political discourse in 
Sweden. Even reforms in the 1990’s, led to a trimming of the welfare state, but not a major re-
evaluation of egalitarian policies. Business has become increasingly active in promoting neo-liberal 
reform but has not been successful in shifting public opinion on the welfare state. Throughout the 
1990’s political discourse focused on the need for ‘social solidarity and the acceptance of moderate 
cutbacks in the generosity of transfers’ (Schmidt 2000: 261). In 2005, former Social Democratic 
Prime Minister Göran Persson, described the need to continue egalitarian social policies now at a time 
when citizens confront uncertainty in the face of a more neoliberal world. "We live in a new age 
where no one has protection, so we must have good insurance and a safety net even for those with 
good salaries," (Nyheter and Dagbladet, 1 September 2005). 
Concerning part-time work, public debate has centered on the treatment and rights of part-
time workers. The terms of labor contracts are largely set by unions, which dislike temporary and 
part-time work (The Economist, 7 September 2006). Unions argue that part-time work should be an 
option but that full-time work is a basic right that should be available to all citizens. In 2005, the trade 
union Kommunal, which represents local council workers, campaigned for new legislation requiring 
employers to give part-time workers full-time employment if they wished. Lars-Åke Almqvist, vice-
chairman of Kommunal, argued, "[T]there is a need for a new law, and then we can create solutions 
using collective agreements in various sectors. The largest problem is the creation of new jobs; but it 
is no answer to have jobs that don't give people enough to live on." Employers' organizations 
countered this position with fierce lobbying of the government in attempt to maintain current 
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legislation. The Swedish Federation of Trade (SFT), which represents retailers, claimed the proposal 
was "an awful idea" and, if adopted, would lead to redundancies (Savage, 3 May 2005). In June 2006, 
debate erupted once again; this time over a proposed piece of legislation that would force employers 
to offer full-time jobs to any part-time worker who worked for them for three years or more.  
More recently, the budget presented at the end of September 2007 by the center-right coalition 
government plans to cutback a number of benefits, including unemployment benefits which can be 
accessed by part-time workers to cover the days they do not work. Currently, part-time workers can 
be compensated for up to 300 days, but as of January 1st 2008 they will only be able to receive 
compensation for 75 days per year. This measure has been widely criticized. The daily newspaper 
Dagens Nyheter recently reported that few people are content with these reforms. Stig-Björn 
Ljunggren, a political economist assures though that "the Right has accepted that the Swedes wish to 
preserve a model with a heavy taxation allowing access to social services, even if they preach more 
private solutions” (Le Monde 10 October 2007). According to the government, "The point of this is to 
reduce overuse and reduce the risk of people becoming permanently locked into part-time work" (The 
Local 20 September 2007). 
The key points to draw from these examples are firstly that extensive debate on the issue of 
part-time work and working time contracts exists in both countries, and secondly, that in both 
societies, people are displeased with cuts in their social benefits. Yet, reform is more or less 
grudgingly accepted in Sweden due to a culture of consensus, while in France it is passionately 
protested.  
  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have attempted to explain why reforms concerning part-time and temporary 
work have been more successfully carried out, in that politicians have had an easier time 
implementing and justifying them, in Sweden than in France. I have argued that four principle factors 
shape a government’s ability to reform part-time work. First of all, Sweden’s social democratic 
welfare regime and France’s Christian democratic one link work and welfare differently. Part-time 
work and nonstandard work agreements are less acceptable in France because the majority of benefits 
can only be accessed through permanent full-time employment, while Sweden provides universal 
basic security and income security. In addition extensive government funded social programs and 
leave schemes provide generous social protection and childcare services, which ensure income and 
pension security. In retrenchment, although it is a general consensus that target benefits tend to be 
easier to cut than universal benefits because the constituency affected is smaller, this does not hold 
true in this case. Esping Andersen describes Christian democratic welfare regimes as ‘frozen 
landscapes’ reinforcing their own traits and rigidities. Palier distinguishes different abilities to 
implement reform between tax and contribution financed benefit schemes. In Sweden some benefits 
are tied to contributions but most are tax financed, while the French welfare state is mostly financed 
by payroll taxes. This partially accounts for France and Sweden’s differing success in implementing 
reforms that reduce benefits. 
Secondly, politics, specifically social partners and political power distribution, contribute to 
the successful implementation of reforms. Sweden has well organized labor unions with high 
participation rates and relatively (to France) powerful social partners that influence decision making. 
France, instead, has fragmented labor unions and social partners, and the regulation of part-time work 
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is managed by the state. The history of political power distribution has also indirectly affected the 
generosity of welfare states. A long almost uninterrupted history of Social Democratic rule in Sweden 
partially explains the development of generous welfare benefits, while in France the more right-
winged Gaullists constructed a more conservative welfare state, although still relatively generous 
compared to other continental European countries. 
Thirdly, the level of women’s labor force participation influences the emphasis given to 
women friendly policies in national legislation on working time. Since most part-time workers are 
women, the strength and organization of the women’s labor force significantly affects the demand for, 
availability of, and legitimacy of part-time work.  In France, women first tended towards full-time 
employment but in response to high unemployment in the late 1970’s were often forced into part-time 
work as a means of work-sharing. By contrast, starting as early as the 1930’s and into the 1960’s and 
70’s, the Swedish government encouraged married women to enter the work-force as part-time 
workers, in response to the shortage of manpower and an expanding public sector. 
Finally, French political decision-makers rarely negotiate with trade unions and social 
partners before implementing reforms and instead frequently try to explain and justify reforms to the 
public after they have occurred. This coupled with a culture of public protest is often a recipe for 
disaster and ends with politicians retracting reform legislation. On the other hand, Sweden has a much 
more coordinated discourse that allows social partners and labor unions a greater role in forming and 
proposing legislation which for obvious reason has a higher rate of public acceptance.     
Resulting from these four factors, I have showed that distinct attitudes towards part-time 
work that have emerged between the two countries: in France part-time work is often viewed as an 
unfavorable form of employment, tainted with a notion of job insecurity and allocated to the most 
vulnerable members of society; while in Sweden it is perceived as a useful tool encouraging the entry 
of women into the labor market and promoting equality between women and men. This is not to 
imply that the employment situation in Sweden is ideal or without its own problems; nor is this a 
suggestion that France copy and paste the ‘Swedish Model’, in fact the four factors I have presented 
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in this paper advocate that national contexts differ greatly enough that this would be nearly 
impossible.  
This study also raises a number of questions. First, what does France’s struggle mean for 
future reforms? Many of the existing academic writings and press articles on the French welfare state 
and the French economy explain that the labor market is overly rigid, that social security is financially 
unsupportable, and that reform of some sort is inevitable. President Sarkozy seems to be making steps 
towards improving the dialogue between the government, unions and social partners, but how valiant 
are these efforts and could he be overlooking other aspects/factors of the problem?  
We can also ask what this might mean for European integration. The EU has asked member 
states to adopt employment directives on matters such as working hours, the right to full-time and 
part-time work, and the benefits allocated to workers. But, as it has no official power to enforce such 
measures, it can only encourage member states to cooperate through benchmarking and peer review, 
while member states’ national governments are alone responsible for adopting and implementing 
directives. What do diverse national contexts of part-time and temporary work mean for the 
harmonization of employment policy at the supranational level? Further research is needed to fully 
respond to this question, but it will likely mean that the adoption of EU directives will firstly face 
many challenges and secondly occur unevenly among member states.  
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